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Abstract
Many authors, including Cavusoglu and Raghunathan (2004. Configuration of detection software: A
comparison of decision and game theory approaches. Decision Anal. 1(3) 131–148.) in this journal, have
argued that proper modeling of the strategic interaction between players requires a game-theoretic approach
as opposed to a decision-theoretic approach. We argue in this paper, however, that there are many
environments in which decision analysis can deal with strategic interactions just as well, and we present
equivalence results for such environments. These equivalence results allow the prescriptive decision analyst to
use the standard tools that a sound decision analysis requires, including decision trees and sensitivity analysis,
even when confronted with strategic settings. We further present two technical comments on the Cavusoglu
and Raghunathan (2004) paper.
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Many authors have argued that proper modeling of the strategic interaction between
players requires a game theoretic approach as opposed to a decision theoretic approach.
We argue in this paper, however, that there are many environments in which decision
analysis can deal with strategic interactions just as well and we present equivalence
results for such environments. These equivalence results allow the prescriptive decision
analyst to use the standard tools that a sound decision analysis requires, including
decision trees and sensitivity analysis, even when confronted with strategic settings.
We further present two technical comments on the Cavusoglu and Raghunathan paper.
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1 Introduction
In their recent paper published in this journal, Cavusoglu and Raghunathan (2004) (CR),
contrast a decision analysis approach with a game theoretic approach to the problem of
configuring detection software.1 They argue that proper modeling for this problem would
require a game theoretic approach and that a firm applying the game theoretic approach
would achieve higher gains than a firm applying a decision analysis approach. Underlying
these arguments is an intellectual divide between the fields of decision analysis and game
theory. The commonly made distinction between the two fields is that decision analysis
focuses on one decision maker (DM) facing an uncertain environment, whereas game theory
also studies the strategic interaction between decision makers.
In contrast, in this comment we argue that there are many situations in which decision
analysis can deal with strategic interactions as well. Many sequential games, such as the
two-stage games considered in this paper (e.g. the Stackelberg leader-follower game), can
be analyzed using a decision analysis approach, as long as the decision theorist chooses the
inputs to the decision problem carefully. For this class of games, sophisticated decision
analysis is equivalent to game theory. In two-player, two-stage games in which the follower
has a unique best response, we show that as long as the chance nodes of the leader in the
decision analysis are chosen to represent the strategy of the follower, a decision analysis is
equivalent to a game theoretic analysis. However, we also provide an example in which a
decision analysis and a game theoretic analysis differ in meaningful ways. It is in these cases
that one might make the argument for going beyond the confines of decision analysis.
In addition to commenting on the conceptual basis for a distinction between game theory
and decision analysis, we make two technical points related to the CR paper. First, we show
that the reasoning presented by CR for their solution to the sequential game is not correct.
Second, we argue that once the authors allow for a discretization of the strategy space, then
one can easily tackle the problem considered in their paper using decision analysis, although
one would need to use a more sophisticated response function than the naive one assumed
in CR’s decision analysis approach.
We begin by defining what we mean by decision analysis and what we mean by game
theory. Decision analysis can be defined as a structured way of thinking about how actions
taken in a decision environment influence the final outcome. As such, we can distinguish
three main features of the decision situation: (i) the set of alternatives, (ii) the chance and
unknown events that can affect the outcome, and (iii) the outcome itself. Decision analysis
1The same issue contained another application of game theory within a decision analysis by Lippman and
McCardle (2004).
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then constructs models that are mathematical representations of the relationships within
and between these three features of the decision situation. A fourth main feature is then an
algorithm for solving the constructed model, usually called the solution concept.2
Once the model is solved, it allows the DM to infer the implications of each course of
action that he might take, so that he can better understand the relationship between his
actions and his objectives. Note that these four key features of a decision analysis, i.e. (i)
the set of alternatives, (ii) the chance and unknown events, (iii) the results and (iv) the
solution concept, have straightforward counterparts in game theory, namely, (i) the strategy
set, (ii) the moves of nature, (iii) the payoff mapping, and (iv) the equilibrium concept. The
difference between decision analysis and game theory can be summarized by the following
elements of a game that a decision analysis does not have: (v) the other players and (vi)
the dependence of the payoffs on the actions of the other players. However, we argue in this
paper that having multiple players does not necessarily imply the need for a game theoretic
analysis. There are many situations in which a decision analysis is equivalent to a game
theoretic analysis, because in many situations it is possible to model the payoff dependence
on the other players’ actions as chance nodes.
For the remainder of this paper, the definitions of game theory and decision analysis
described above are too broad. Instead, we will focus on the definitions given in the sections
below. In these definitions, we assume some basic concepts are understood, such as the
definitions of a decision tree and an extensive and normal form game. Further, we define a
solution to the decision tree as a selection of actions from the decision nodes that maximize
the decision maker’s expected payoff.
The comment proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we state the required definitions and
then provide results for environments with sequential or simultaneous strategic interaction.
We assess how well pure decision analysis (i.e., decision analysis that does not allow
randomization over actions) and extended decision analysis (i.e., decision analysis that allows
for randomization) are able to address strategic situations. In Section 3 we offer our more
technical comments on the CR paper. In Section 4, we conclude.
2 Decision Analysis versus Game Theory
2.1 Definitions
We begin by defining what we mean by pure decision analysis and then we define an
extended decision analysis. Whereas pure decision analysis does not allow a strategic mixing
2These definitions are paraphrased versions of the definitions formulated by the Decision Analysis Society.
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over strategies, extended decision analysis does allow such mixed strategies. These mixed
strategies are, in fact, optimal strategies as long as the decision maker is randomizing over
actions that each maximize his or her expected payoff. Specifically in the context of auditing
and detection, which is the example introduced in CR, such mixtures over actions play an
important role.
Definition 1 A pure decision analysis is a solved decision tree that provides a selection of
pure actions from the decision nodes that maximize the decision maker’s expected payoff or
utility.
Note that a pure decision analysis does not let a decision maker randomize over actions.
In fact, when a decision maker is playing against nature, there is no value-added from
randomizing over actions. When two actions lead to the same outcome, the decision maker
is simply indifferent between the two. The DM can then randomly select one of those
actions, but there is no reason for applying one randomization mechanism versus another.
This randomization is therefore of no interest to the pure decision analyst.
Second, we define what we mean by a game theoretic analysis.
Definition 2 A game theoretic analysis is a game, either in extensive or normal form,
together with an equilibrium strategy profile.
As described in the introduction, one of the main characteristics of a game is the presence
of multiple players. We can study the behavior of multiple players in a decision analysis by
simply considering multiple trees. We focus on games with two players, although the analysis
extends to a finite number of players. In the presence of two players, we consider two trees,
one for each player.
Definition 3 A paired pure decision analysis is a pair of solved decision trees, where the
decision nodes in one tree correspond to the (degenerate) chance nodes in the other tree, and
where the (degenerate) probabilities on the chance nodes in one tree correspond to the payoff
maximizing pure decisions in the other tree.
Definition 4 A paired pure decision analysis is equivalent to a game theoretic analysis if
the selected actions for player 1 in the first decision analysis match the player’s equilibrium
strategy in the game theoretic analysis, and similarly for the selected actions for player 2 in
the second decision analysis.
A pure decision analysis is intended to analyze a DM’s optimal actions when playing
against nature. Therefore, there is no value-added from playing randomized (mixed)
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strategies. We can extend pure decision analysis by allowing for mixed strategies, which we
call extended decision analysis. The main motivation for introducing such mixed strategies
is that in strategic settings a solution in pure strategies may not exist.
Definition 5 An extended decision analysis is a solved decision tree that provides a selection
of, possibly randomized, actions from the decision nodes that maximize the decision maker’s
expected payoff or utility.
We can extend the definitions of a paired decision analysis and of equivalence in the
obvious way.
Definition 6 A paired extended decision analysis is a pair of solved decision trees, where
the decision nodes in one tree correspond to the chance nodes in the other tree, and where the
probabilities on the chance nodes in one tree correspond to the payoff maximizing decisions
in the other tree.
Definition 7 A paired extended decision analysis is equivalent to a game theoretic analysis
if the probabilities associated with selected actions for player 1 in the first decision analysis
match the player’s equilibrium strategy in the game theoretic analysis, and similarly for the
selected actions for player 2 in the second decision analysis.
2.2 Sequential Strategic Interaction
We now investigate how well a pure decision analysis is able to model the strategic interaction
between players in a two-player leader-follower game, which is defined below.
Definition 8 A two-player leader-follower game is a pair (A, pi), where A1 and A2 are the
action sets and pi1 : A1 × A2 → R and pi2 : A1 × A2 → R are the payoff functions of the
two players. The follower has a unique best response for every possible action of the leader
if ∀a1 ∈ A1, argmaxa2∈A2 pi2(a1, a2) is a (non-empty) singleton set.
One popular equilibrium concept for this game is the subgame-perfect equilibrium, which
we define below. In what follows, given set S, we let ∆(S) denote the set of probability
distributions over the elements of S.
Definition 9 A subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the two-player leader-follower game
(A, pi), where the follower has a unique best response for every possible action of the




1 ∈ ∆(A1) and a∗2 : A1 → A2, such that ∀a1 ∈ A1, a∗2(a1) ∈
argmaxa2∈A2 pi2(a1, a2) and ∀a1 ∈ {A1 | σ∗1(a1) > 0}, a1 ∈ argmaxa1∈A1 pi1(a1, a2(a1)).
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We can now state our first proposition.
Proposition 1 Given a two-player leader-follower game in which the follower has a unique
best response for every possible action of the leader, for every game theoretic analysis
involving a pure-strategy SPE, there exists an equivalent paired pure decision analysis.
Proof. Take a pure-strategy SPE of the extensive-form game as given. It must
specify for each action a1 ∈ A1 of the leader, the unique action aBR2 (a1) ∈ A2 of
the follower, and it must specify as the equilibrium strategy for the leader, an action
aBR1 ∈ argmaxa1∈A1 pi1(a1, a2(a1)). We now construct an equivalent decision analysis. For
the first decision tree, begin with a decision node for player 1, with a branch for each action
in A1, and with each branch followed by a chance node that has a branch for each action
in A2. For all a1 ∈ A1, for the chance node attached to decision node branch a1, let the
probability be one on branch aBR2 (a1) and zero on all other branches. For the decision node,
select the branch aBR1 . Given the definitions of a
BR
1 , this is a (correctly) solved decision tree.
For the second decision tree, begin with a chance node for player 1, with the branch for
action aBR1 receiving probability one and all other branches receiving probability zero. At
the end of each branch, attach a decision node with a branch for each action in A2. For the
decision node attached to chance node branch a1, select branch a
BR
2 (a1). Given the definition
of aBR2 , this is a (correctly) solved decision tree. By construction the paired pure decision
analysis is equivalent to the game theoretic analysis. Q.E.D.
As an application of Proposition 1, consider the usual Stackelberg leader-follower game.
To begin, view the leader as the decision maker and view the follower’s behavior as
probabilistic, but use the follower’s best response function to determine the conditional
probabilities (conditional on the leader’s choice) associated with his available actions. For
any two-player sequential move game in which the follower has a unique best response for
every possible action of the leader, a decision analysis approach with this type of sophisticated
modeling on the leader’s uncertainty regarding the follower’s action, is equivalent to a game
theoretic approach.
To give a more concrete example of the Stackelberg game, assume two firms, linear
demand P = a− bQ, where Q = q1 + q2, and constant marginal cost c. Assume a > c ≥ 0
and b > 0. In the first stage the leader, firm 1, chooses its quantity, and then in the second
stage the follower, firm 2, chooses its quantity. The payoff for firm i is (a− bQ− c)qi.
In any SPE of the game, given quantity q1 for the leader, the follower chooses q2 to solve
max
q2
(a− bq1 − bq2 − c)q2.
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in the subgame defined by a quantity choice of




(a− bq1 − bqr2(q1)− c)q1.
Thus, in the unique SPE of the game, the leader chooses q1 =
a−c
2b
and, on the equilibrium
path, the follower chooses q2 =
a−c
4b
. Off the equilibrium path, the follower chooses according
to the reaction function qr2(q1).
To construct the paired decision analysis for this game, first construct a tree for the
leader in which the decision node for the leader is followed by a chance node representing
the follower’s actions. Following choice q1 by the leader, assign probability 1 to action q
r
2(q1)




construct a tree for the follower in which the initial node is a chance node, representing the
leader’s actions, and then each branch for the chance node is followed by a decision node
for the follower. Assign probability 1 to the branch representing q1 =
a−c
2b
. In this tree, the










To given an example with finite action spaces, consider a game of product differentiation.
There are two firms, a leader and a follower. The leader moves first, deciding between
two possible product configurations, A and B. Then the follower responds with a product
configuration decision of its own, choosing between configurations C and D. The payoffs are




A 10, 10 20, 20
B 30, a 10, 30− a
In this game, the follower’s best reply to A is D, and the follower’s best reply to B is
C if a > 15 and D otherwise (with indifference if a = 15). Thus, in the SPE, if a < 15,
the leader chooses A, anticipating a payoff of 20 from A and a payoff of 10 from B, and if
a > 15, the leader chooses B, anticipating a payoff of 20 from A and a payoff of 30 from B.
Thus, the SPE outcome is (A,D) if a < 15 and (B,C) if a > 15. (If a = 15, then there is a
SPE in which the leader chooses A and the follower chooses D and the follower chooses D
off the equilibrium path after the leader chooses B, and there is a SPE in which the leader
chooses B and the follower chooses C and the follower chooses D off the equilibrium path
after the leader chooses A.)
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Once again, the game can be represented as a paired decision analysis. In the leader’s
decision tree, the follower choice is modeled as a chance node with probability one of the
follower’s best reply. In the follower’s decision tree, the leader’s choice is modeled as a chance
node with probability one on the leader’s payoff-maximizing strategy.
Note that in this game, as the parameter a increases from below 15 to above 15, the
follower’s best reply to B changes and, as a result, the leader’s optimal strategy changes.
Thus, even though the parameter affects only the follower’s profit, changes in the parameter
can cause a shift in the leader’s optimal strategy because the leader anticipates the effect of
the parameter on the follower’s best reply.
These results show that thoughtful decision analysis can be used in place of game theoretic
analysis for certain types of sequential strategic interaction. In the next section, we consider
simultaneous strategic interaction.
2.3 Simultaneous Strategic Interaction
Now we investigate how well a pure decision analysis is able to model the strategic interaction
between players in a two-player simultaneous move game, which we define below.
Definition 10 A two-player simultaneous game is a pair (A, pi), where A1 and A2 are the
action sets and pi1 : A1 ×A2 → R and pi2 : A1 ×A2 → R are the payoff functions of the two
players.
Definition 11 A Nash equilibrium of the two-player simultaneous game (A, pi) is (σ∗1, σ
∗
2),
where σ∗1 ∈ ∆(A1) and σ∗2 ∈ ∆(A2), such that σ∗2 ∈ argmaxσ2∈∆(A2) pi2(σ∗1, σ2) and
σ∗1 ∈ argmaxσ1∈∆(A1) pi1(σ1, σ∗2).
In what follows we refer to a strategy in a game theoretic analysis as strictly mixed if it
places positive probability on at least two actions, i.e., if it is not a pure strategy.
As the following proposition shows, we now have another example of equivalence between
decision analysis and game theoretic analysis.
Proposition 2 Given a game theoretic analysis consisting of a two-player simultaneous-
move game and a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, there exists an equivalent paired pure
decision analysis.
Proof. Take a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game as given. As
in the proof of Proposition 1, one can choose actions in the paired decision analysis to match
the equilibrium actions in the game theoretic analysis. Q.E.D.
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In contrast, when the Nash Equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game is in mixed
strategies, and each player in a decision analysis can only select one action, there is no pure
paired decision analysis that is consistent with the Nash Equilibrium. This suggests a flaw
in the standard definition of a decision analysis, but as stated in the following proposition,
this flaw is easily corrected by allowing a DM to randomize over actions that give it the same
expected payoff or utility.
Proposition 3 Given a game theoretic analysis consisting of a two-player simultaneous-
move game and a strictly mixed Nash equilibrium, there exists a paired extended decision
analysis that is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium of the game, although there does not exist
an equivalent paired pure decision analysis.
Proof. Take the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game as given. As in the proofs
of the above results, choose probabilities in the extended paired decision analysis to match
the equilibrium probabilities. Q.E.D.
Although Proposition 3 shows that a paired extended decision analysis exists that is
equivalent to a game theoretic analysis for a two-player simultaneous-move game with a
unique Nash equilibrium in completely mixed strategies, to find the Nash equilibrium, one
must go beyond a one-step iteration of the paired decision trees.
To illustrate the use of decision analysis in simple simultaneous move games, consider the
inspection game (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1993, Example 1.7). In that game the firm chooses
either to inspect or not inspect a worker, who chooses either to shirk or work. Working costs
the user g and produces output with value v for the firm. Inspection costs h to the firm. The
firm pays the user w unless the user is caught shirking. The payoffs are as follows, where




I −h, 0 v − w − h, w − g
NI −w,w v − w,w − g
In the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, the firm mixes between inspecting and not,
with probability g/w on inspection, and the worker mixes between shirking and working,
with probability h/w on shirking.
In games such as this (simultaneous move games with a unique Nash equilibrium in
completely mixed strategies), the game theoretic approach requires that one solve the
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following system of equations, where x denotes the probability with with the worker shirks
and y denotes the probability with which the firm inspects:
−hx− (v − w − h) (1− x) = −wx+ (v − w)(1− x)
w(1− y) = w − g.
One could identify the Nash equilibrium by setting up two decision trees, one with the
firm as the decision maker and one with the worker as the decision maker, as shown in
Figure 1, and then iterating until the two decision trees were consistent in the sense that the
behavior anticipated by the decision maker in one tree was, in fact, optimal for the decision
maker in the other tree, and vice versa. If such a process converges, then it identifies a Nash
equilibrium.
Insert Figure 1 Here
In Figure 1, the upper tree depicts the tree of the worker who chooses between shirking
and working, or some randomization between the two with a probability x on shirking.
Similarly the second tree shows the decision problem of the firm who chooses to either
inspect, or not inspect, or mix with a probability y on inspecting. As described above, in
the Nash equilibrium, the two trees should be consistent with one and another. This is
guaranteed by the strategic use of the variables x and y, which appear in one tree as the
decision variable and in the other as a subjective probability. When x = h/w the expected
value for each of the firm’s alternatives is equal and therefore the firm may as well mix over
inspecting and not inspecting. Equivalently, when y = g/w the worker may as well mix over
shirking and not shirking. So, for these values of x and y, the two trees are consistent.
For any other values of x and y the trees will be inconsistent. Suppose, for example, that
the firm’s subjective probability of dealing with a shirking worker equals x > h/w. Then it
is optimal for the firm always to inspect. However, if the firm always inspects, consistency
of the two trees requires that the worker’s subjective probability of facing an inspecting firm
be y = 1. This means that the agent should never shirk, which (once more appealing to
the consistency between the trees) implies that the firm should have a subjective probability
of dealing with a shirking worker x = 0, which contradicts the initially assumed subjective
probability x > h/w.
As mentioned above, in order to identify the Nash equilibrium in the two decision trees of
Figure 1, one could iterate until the two decision trees are consistent. However, this iterative
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process is not part of a standard decision analysis. In other words, there is no single-pass
approach, such as backwards induction or rolling back the tree, that delivers the solution to
this problem. It is in problems like this one in which the simultaneity is the key issue that
allow us to clearly distinguish the decision analysis and game theoretic approaches.3
One thing that is part of standard decision analysis is sensitivity analysis to see how the
recommended decision changes with changes in various parameters. In the context of a paired
decision analysis, sensitivity analysis would be conducted with respect to some parameter
by changing the value of that parameter in both of the trees in the paired decision analysis.
A paired decision analysis specifies a particular solution for each tree (multiple solutions
are possible if the DM is indifferent between alternatives at a decision node), and once a
parameter value is changed, one can easily check whether the prior solution continues to be
a solution in the revised decision trees. If it is not, then the decision, and corresponding
equilibrium in an equivalent game theoretic analysis, is not robust to that parameter change.
As described above, in some cases an iterative process allows one to identify new solutions to
the two trees such that they once again form a paired decision analysis, where the selections
from the decision nodes in one tree correspond to the probabilities on the chance nodes in
the other tree. A new solution identified in this way suggests one possible change in the
outcome that might result from the parameter change under consideration. But, as noted
above, there may be no finite iterative process that can identify a new solution. In this case,
the sensitivity analysis may be best performed in the context of the game theoretic analysis,
where one can identify the new equilibrium of the game.
3 Solving the Detection Software Game
The remainder of our paper makes two main points regarding CR. First, we argue that the
reasoning that they present for their solution to the sequential game is not quite right. Our
second point is that once the authors allow for a discretization of the strategy space (their
ε > 0), one can easily tackle the problem considered in their paper using decision analysis.
To do this, we need to apply the method we explained in the previous sections. Our method
proposes a more sophisticated response function than the naive one assumed in CR’s decision
3As noted by Fudenberg and Tirole (1993, chapter 1, footnote 9), one can easily compute the optimal
contract, i.e., the w that maximizes the principal’s, i.e. the firm’s, expected payoff. This optimal wage
is given by w =
√
hv. Further, the game substantially changes when the principal can “commit” to an
inspection level. In this case the principal is better off. Consider the game where the principal plays first
and commits to an inspection level y. The agent, i.e., the worker, after observing y chooses whether to shirk.
For a given value of w (>g) the principal can choose y = g/w + ε, where ε is positive and small. The agent
then works with probability 1. Note that this commitment essentially turns the simultaneous game into a
sequential game, which is the subject of Section 2.2.
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analysis approach.
3.1 Equilibrium in CR’s Sequential Game
In the sequential game considered in CR, there are two players, the firm and the user. The
idea behind the game is that the firm must set up detection software and a strategy for
conducting audits, while the user decides whether to commit fraud or not. In the first stage,
the firm chooses the configuration point and the inspection strategy. The configuration point
represents the tradeoff between false positives and false negatives and is given by (PD, PF ),
where PD is the probability of detection conditional on there being fraud, and PF is the
probability of a false positive. The inspection strategy consists of two probabilities (ρ1, ρ2),
where ρ1 is the probability of investigation when the program signals a fraud and ρ2 is
the probability of investigation when the program signals no fraud. The damage from an
undetected fraud for the firm is d and the cost of manual investigation is c. The user’s pure
strategies are to commit fraud or not. The user receives a benefit of µ for committing fraud
if not detected. If the fraud is detected, the user incurs a penalty of β leading to a net benefit
of µ− β. The probability that a user commits fraud is denoted by ψ.
To ease notation, let s1 ∈ S1 ≡ {(PD, PF , ρ1, ρ2) | PD, PF , ρ1, ρ2 ∈ [0, 1]} denote the firm’s
strategy and s2 ∈ {F,N} denote the user’s strategy. Let pi1(s1, s2) be the firm’s payoff given
the players’ strategies, and let pi2(s1, s2) be the user’s payoff given the players’ strategies.




ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 1 (−c, µ− β) (−c, 0)
ρ1 = 1, ρ2 = 0 (−d− (c− d)PD, µ− PDβ) (−cPF , 0)
ρ1 = 0, ρ2 = 1 (−c+ (c− d)PD, µ− (1− PD)β) (−c(1− PF ), 0)
ρ1 = 0, ρ2 = 0 (−d, µ) (0, 0)
In the second stage of the game, the user takes the firm’s strategy as given and
chooses s2 to solve maxs2∈{F,N} pi2(s1, s2). If pi2(s1, F ) > pi2(s1, N), then s
∗
2(s1) = F ; if
pi2(s1, F ) < pi2(s1, N), then s
∗
2(s1) = N ; and if pi2(s1, F ) = pi2(s1, N), then the user is
indifferent between F and N and so any mixture between F and N is a best response. Let
σ∗2(s1) denote the user’s equilibrium strategy.
In the first stage of the game, the firm takes the user’s strategy as given and chooses s1 to
solve maxs1∈S1 pi1(s1, σ
∗
2(s1)). CR identify a partition of S1, {SF1 , SN1 , SM1 }, where the user’s
unique best response for any s1 ∈ SF1 is fraud, his unique best response for any s1 ∈ SN1 is
no fraud, and for any s1 ∈ SM1 , he is indifferent between fraud and no fraud.
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CR dismiss the case of s1 ∈ SF1 . Presumably they have in mind an assumption under
which the firm strictly prefers to choose some s1 ∈ SN1 ∪ SM1 over any s1 ∈ SF1 . Clearly
the optimal strategy for the firm in SF1 is the least-cost solution of never investigating, i.e.,
ρ1 = ρ2 = 0. In this case, the firm’s payoff is −d, where d is the damage from undetected
fraud. CR’s “Case 1” considers the case in which s1 ∈ SN1 . A correct analysis of this case
shows that because the set SN1 is open, the solution to maxs1∈SN1 pi1(s1, N) does not exist.
Thus, there can be no equilibrium in which s1 ∈ SN1 . In contrast, CR discretize the set SN1
and find the limit of the firm’s best reply as the unit of discretization approaches zero.
It is important for the calculation of the solution that CR identify an upper bound
for maxs1∈SN1 pi1(s1, N), which we can write as sups1∈SN1 pi1(s1, N). Next, CR’s “Case 2”
considers the case in which s1 ∈ SM1 . CR dismiss this case as never giving the firm
a higher payoff than in their Case 1. However, an optimal strategy for the firm does
not exist for Case 1. A correct analysis would ask whether there exists ψ ∈ [0, 1]
such that there is a solution to maxs1∈SM1 ψpi1(s1, F ) + (1 − ψ)pi1(s1, N) and such that
maxs1∈SM1 ψpi1(s1, F ) + (1 − ψ)pi1(s1, N) ≥ sups1∈SN1 pi1(s1, N). If such a ψ can be found,
then we have identified an equilibrium of the game. Furthermore, as long as we can rule out
equilibria involving s1 ∈ SF1 , the set of all such ψ characterize the set of all equilibria of the
game.
Since SM1 is compact and pi1(s1, F ) and pi1(s1, N) are continuous in s1, a solution exists
for any ψ. However, one can show that for ψ > 0, maxs1∈SM1 ψpi1(s1, F )+ (1−ψ)pi1(s1, N) <
sups1∈SN1 pi1(s1, N). (This argument appears indirectly in CR.) Thus, there can be no
equilibrium involving ψ > 0.
Thus, we conclude that in any equilibrium ψ = 0, i.e., the user commits fraud with
probability zero. Assuming pi1(s1, N) has a unique maximizer on S
M
1 , then the unique
equilibrium is for the firm to choose s1 to solve maxs1∈SM1 pi1(s1, N) and the user not to
commit fraud. (If pi1 does not have a unique maximizer on S
M
1 , then there exist equilibria
in which the firm uses a mixed strategy.) In particular, the equilibrium value of s1 is not an
element of SN1 as implied by the analysis presented in CR.
4 Although in equilibrium both
players choose pure strategies, in equilibrium the user is indifferent between committing
fraud and not. In addition, CR’s arguments do not clearly establish the uniqueness of the
equilibrium.
4On p.141, CR state that “the equilibrium solution of the sequential game when ρ
1
PD + ρ2(1−PD) > µβ




= 0, P ∗D =
µ
β
, ....” Although this suggests that the game has an equilibrium in this
case, one can show that the condition ρ1PD + ρ2(1 − PD) > µβ is not satisfied at the equilibrium values.
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3.2 Extended Decision Analysis in CR’s Sequential Game
We now apply our extended decision analysis approach to CR’s detection software
application. First, we present the two decision trees. Figures 2 and 3 below show the
decision trees of respectively the firm and the user. The firm chooses a mixed strategy where
conditional on a signal, it investigates with probability ρ1 and conditional on no signal it
investigates with probability ρ2. The user chooses a mixed strategy over committing fraud
or no fraud, i.e. commit fraud (F) with probability ψ and no fraud (NF) with probability
1− ψ. The symbols S and NS indicate whether there is a signal (S) or no signal (NS) from
the detection software. The detection software gives a false positive (i.e., it detects a fraud
when there is none) with probability PF and gives a false negative (i.e., it does not detect a
fraud when there is) with probability 1− PD.
In the sequential game, the firm rolls back the tree of the user to derive the probability
of fraud ψ as a function of the probabilities ρ1 and ρ2, substitutes this probability into its
own decision tree and optimizes over ρ1 and ρ2.
Insert Figure 2 Here
Figure 2: Decision tree for the firm in the detection software game.
Insert Figure 3 Here
Figure 3: Decision tree for the user in the detection software game.
4 Conclusion
In a response to Cavusoglu and Raghunathan (2004) (CR), which was published in this
journal, we formulate three points, one conceptual and two technical. Conceptually, we
argue in this paper that there are many situations in which decision analysis can deal with
strategic interactions just as well as game theory can. When the equilibrium of the game
is in pure strategies, it is relatively straightforward to find decision trees that are consistent
with the equilibrium of the game. However, when the equilibrium of the game involves mixed
strategies, we need to extend decision analysis for it to be able to model strategic situations.
One might argue that in most decision settings, some player has to move first. As long
as the decision made by that first mover is observed by the second mover, then allowing
for randomization over actions is sufficient to prove equivalence between game theory and
an extended decision analysis, at least one with a sophisticated view towards modeling
expectations about the second mover’s behavior. In this environment, game theory adds
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value to the decision analysis through its suggestion on how the decision maker should form
its beliefs about the behavior of the environment, i.e., about the actions of players whose
behavior is modeled as uncertain.
We further make two technical points related to the CR paper. First, the reasoning
presented by CR for their solution to the sequential game is not quite correct. One can also
complete their argument by establishing uniqueness of the equilibrium. Second, we argue
that once the authors allow for a discretization of the strategy space, then one can easily
tackle the problem considered in the paper using decision analysis. To do this, one would
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Figure 1: Decision tree representation of the inspection game.
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Figure 2: Decision tree for the firm in the detection software game. The probabilities η1 and
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Figure 3: Decision tree for the user in the detection software game.
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